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I. Jewish Idol Polemic: Is It Reflective o f  Pagan1 Beliefs?
One set of trademark convictions of early Judaism and Christianity includes 
their aniconic tradition, monotheistic commitment, and polemic against idols. In 
the late second or early third century c .e ., for example, Christian apologist Minucius 
Felix mocked pagan idol worship with these words: “When does the god come into 
being? The image is cast, hammered, or sculpted; it is not yet a god. It is soldered, 
put together, and erected; it is still not a god. It is adorned, consecrated, prayed 
to— and now, finally, it is a god once man has willed it so and dedicated it” (see 
Oct. 22.5). The Christian haranguing of idolatry goes back to the Jewish Scriptures,
1 There is some concern among biblical and religion scholars that the word “pagan” is pejora­
tive and unfairly judgmental. In this article, I use this term only to refer to non-Christian and non- 
Jewish Greeks and Romans. It should be noted, also, that the term “pagan” is still widely used by 
historians for non-Christian religions of classical antiquity. See, e.g., The Cambridge Companion 
to Greek and Roman Philosophy (ed. David Sedley; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003); One God: Pagan Monotheism in the Roman Empire (ed. Stephen Mitchell and Peter van 
Nuffelen; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); A Companion to Greek Mythology (ed. 
Ken Dowden and Niall Livingstone; Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). For a helpful discussion 
of terminological options, and the necessary (albeit imperfect) use of the words “pagan” and “pagan­
ism,” see Hans-Josef Klauck, Magic and Paganism in Early Christianity: The World o f the Acts o f 
the Apostles (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000) 1.
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most notably Jeremiah, Isaiah, and the Psalms.2 Similar polemical statements can 
be found in Habakkuk (2:18-20). This tradition is expanded in early Jewish texts 
such as Bel and the Dragon, Wisdom of Solomon, Apocalypse o f Abraham, the 
tractates of Philo, and, most extensively, the Epistle of Jeremiah.3 We find idol 
polemic in the NT in places such as Acts 19:26 and Rev 9:20.4 The wider idea that 
stands behind almost all Jewish and Christian idol-polemic texts is this: Do not 
worship statues, because they are not gods! (So Jer 16:20: “Can people make for 
themselves gods? Yes, but they are not gods!”; cf. Isa 37:19; Josephus A.J. 10.4.1 
§50; Epistle of Jeremiah passim). According to this logic, idols should not be 
worshiped because they are handmade works; they are creations, not creators. As 
far as the early Jews and Christians were concerned, pagans worshiped blocks of 
metal, stone, and wood, and this was improper because such materials could never 
amount to a real “god.”
But is this a fair criticism of pagans? Did they really worship statues as gods? 
For many modem biblical scholars it is a foregone conclusion that this Jewish idol 
polemic is hyperbolic and a rhetorical caricature. According to these scholars, this 
is vituperative satire that does not reflect how the pagan neighbors of Jews and 
Christians actually thought and worshiped. They did not worship statues, so some 
argue, but saw these statues as symbolic or representative of their deity’s presence.
2 See Horst Dietrich Preuss, Verspottung fremder Religionen im Alien Testament (BWANT 
92; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971); Jose Faur, “The Biblical Idea of Idolatry,” JQR 69 (1978) 1-15; 
William W. Hallo, “Cult Statue and Divine Image: A Preliminary Study,” in Scripture in Context II: 
More Essays on the Comparative Method (ed. William W. Hallo et al.; Winona Lake, IN: Eisen- 
brauns, 1983) 1-17; Heinrich Schiltzinger, “B'ild und Wesen der Gottheit im alten Mesopotamien,” 
in Gotterbild in Kunst undSchrift (ed. Hans-Joachim Klimkeit; Studium Universale 2; Bonn: Bou- 
vier, 1984) 61-80; Walter Brueggemann, Israel’s Praise: Doxology against Idolatry and Ideology 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988); John Day, “Ezekiel and the Heart of Idolatry,” BSac 164 (2007) 
21-33; Stuart Weeks, “Man-Made Gods? Idolatry in the Old Testament,” in Idolatry: False Worship 
in the Bible, Early Judaism, and Christianity (ed. Stephen C. Barton; T&T Clark Theology; New 
York: T&T Clark, 2007) 7-21; Nathan MacDonald, “Monotheism and Isaiah,” in Interpreting Isa­
iah: Issues and Approaches (ed. David G. Firth and H. G. M. Williamson; Downers Grove, IL: IVP 
Academic, 2009) 43-61.
3 See Karl-Gustav Sandelin, “The Danger of Idolatry according to Philo of Alexandria,” Teme- 
nos 27 (1991) 109-50; Lawrence H. Schiffman, “Laws concerning Idolatry in the Temple Scroll,” 
in Uncovering Ancient Stones: Essays in Memory o f H. Neil Richardson (ed. Lewis M. Hopfe; 
Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1994) 159-75; Claudia Bergmann, “Idol Worship in Bel and the 
Dragon and Other Jewish Literature from the Second Temple Period,” in Septuagint Research: 
Issues and Challenges in the Study o f the Greek Jewish Scriptures (ed. Wolfgang Kraus and 
R. Glenn Wooden; SBLSCS 53; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006) 207-23; John M. G. 
Barclay, “Snarling Sweetly: Josephus on Images and Idols,” in Idolatry (ed. Barton), 73-87; Andrei A. 
Orlov, “‘The Gods of My Father Terah’: Abraham the Iconoclast and the Polemics with the Divine 
Body Traditions in the Apocalypse of Abraham,” JSP 18 (2008) 33-53.
4 See Paul J. Achtemeier, “Gods Made with Hands: The New Testament and the Problem of 
Idolatry,” ExAuditu 15 (1999) 43-61; Joel Marcus, “Idolatry in the New Testament,” Int 60 (2006) 
152-64.
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This presumption is matter-of-factly stated, for example, by biblical com­
mentator Jerry L. Sumney: '‘Polytheists did not identify the god with the statue 
standing in the temple.”5 Similarly, Philip R. Davies states, “Worshippers of deities 
that are represented in the form of idols do not make the mistake of thinking that 
these images are the gods.”6 And Ronald Williamson chastises Philo of Alexandria, 
for example, for sustaining an argument that the Egyptians worshiped statues, an 
argument that (Williamson argues) does not reflect their real religious perspective 
such that this rhetorical ploy appears to be little more than propaganda.7 Does this 
supposed modern scholarly consensus reflect pagan religious thought?
Clearly, Christian and Jewish writers were mocking idol worship, but did they 
mistakenly (or purposely) argue that pagans directly worshiped the cult statue 
as their god? Did pagans see the statue as merely a statue? In this article, I seek 
to explore precisely this matter. To make this study more narrowly focused, I 
will look exclusively at Greco-Roman religion, as the early Jewish and Christian 
examples of idol polemic, in particular, appear in this context. There are some 
philosophical conversations about this subject that support the above-mentioned 
scholarly impressions that pagans “knew” that their cult statues were not actual 
gods. For example, Heraclitus of Ephesus (ca. 535-ca. 475 b.c .e .) famously 
warned that too many worshipers of the gods paid homage to mere statues, “as if 
chattering with houses, not recognizing what gods or even heroes are like.”8 Sim­
ilarly, Plato wrote, “We erect images of the gods as statues, and we honour these 
even though they have no souls, but we believe that because of this those gods who 
do have souls have goodwill and charis” (Leg. 11.931al-4).9
5 Jerry L. Sumney, Colossians: A Commentary (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
2008) 191; other examples include John Barton, ‘“The Work of Human Hands’ (Psalm 115:4): 
Idolatry in the Old Testament,” in The Ten Commandments: The Reciprocity o f Faithfulness (ed. 
William P. Brown; Library of Theological Ethics; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2004) 199- 
200; WaltherZimmerli, Old Testament Theology in Outline (Atlanta: John Knox, 1978) 123; John J. 
Collins, Daniel: A Commentary on the Book o f Daniel (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994) 
418; Joan E. Cook, Hear, O Heavens, and Listen, O Earth: An Introduction to the Prophets 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2006) 230.
6 Philip R. Davies, “God of Cyrus, God of Israel: Some Religio-Historical Reflections on 
Isaiah 40-55,” in Words Remembered, Texts Renewed: Essays in Honour o f John F. A. Sawyer (ed. 
Jon Davies, Graham Harvey, and Wilfred G. E. Watson; JSOTSup 195; Sheffield: Sheffield Aca­
demic Press, 1995) 222.
7 According to Ronald Williamson, “It has been suggested that Philo should have known—and 
did in fact know—that intelligent pagans did not worship the cult object before which they made 
their devotions, but that Jewish propaganda misrepresented it. Philo almost certainly knew that 
Egyptians did not bow down to the animals before which they bowed down, but only to the gods 
they represented, but to have admitted that in his writings would have served only to weaken his 
apologia on behalf of Judaism” (see Jews in the Hellenistic World: Philo [Cambridge Commentar­
ies on Writings of the Jewish and Christian World, 200 B.C. toA.D. 200 1.2; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989] 31; emphasis original).
8 Celsus apparently agreed with Heraclitus on this matter; see Origen Cels. 7.62, 65.
9 In the fourth century b.c .e ., Dionysius the Younger, ruler of Syracuse, “stripped the statue
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This was a topic of some interest among Greek and Roman philosophers, but 
their sharp comments reveal that they were challenging popular or folk beliefs and 
habits of the people. Thus, the philosophers do not represent a majority or common 
perspective. So classicist Deborah Steiner concludes:
[F]or all his critical tone, the philosopher has succinctly expressed the way in which 
Greeks o f his and other ages commonly imagined the relationship between the god 
(or hero) and his visual representation, and has acknowledged the concept under­
pinning the efficacy ascribed to images venerated in cult: the statue acts as a vessel, a 
potential or actual container for the numinous power that could take up residence 
inside.10
II. Theorizing Greco-Roman Cultic Worship 
with and through Statues
In order to make sense of how Greeks and Romans worshiped and how and 
why they used statues, it is helpful to examine closely how statues were understood 
in general in antiquity. Derek Collins, in his book Magic in the Ancient Greek 
World, directs attention to Greek habits and attitudes regarding the function of 
statues and offers a number of fascinating case studies. He argues that, for Greeks, 
statues regularly functioned as proxies. For example, Pausanias (Descr. 6.11.2-9) 
tells us the story of famed athlete Theagenes of whom a bronze statue was pro­
duced after his death. An enemy of Theagenes, wanting to punish his nemesis, 
flogged the bronze statue. According to Pausanias’s account, the statue fought back 
and killed the opponent. The sons of the murdered man proceeded to prosecute the 
statue. The court tried the statue and found it guilty, which resulted in a sentence 
of exile.11 Based on this example (and many others), Collins attempts to process 
how such a tale reveals a particular folk perspective of statue ontology and agency. 
He concludes, “In anthropological terms, the statue of Theagenes is a social
of Zeus in Sicily of its golden cloak and ordered it to be clothed in a woolen one, with the witty 
remark that this was better than the golden one being both lighter in summer and warmer in winter” 
(see Clement of Alexandria Protrept. 4.46). According to Diogenes Laertius, the Greek philosopher 
Stilpo cleverly engaged a challenger with this dialogue: ‘“Athena is the daughter of Zeus, is she 
not?’ ‘Yes,’ ‘But this Athena (pointing to the image) was not produced by Zeus but by Phidias.’ His 
opponent agrees. ‘Then,’ Stilpo concludes, ‘Athena is not a goddess’” (Lives 2.2.116). Not much 
later in history, Horace wrote this in his Satires about an idol recognizing its own origins: “Once I 
was a fig-tree, good-for-nothing wood, when the craftsman, after hesitating a while whether to make 
me a stool or a Priapus, decided for a god” (1.8.1). See Stijn Bussels, The Animated Image: Roman 
Theory on Naturalism, Vividness, and Divine Power (Kunst und Wirkmacht: Studien aus dem 
Warburg-Haus 11; Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2012) 152-54.
10 Deborah Steiner, Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and 
Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 79.
11 See also Stephen G. Miller, Arete: Greek Sports from Ancient Sources (3rd expanded ed.; 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) 113-14.
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agent—it is effectively a human being and is therefore, from the functional view­
point of the relevant community, treated like one.”12
Comparatively, archaeologists have noted a trend in ancient Hellenistic burial 
customs where statues were found in unearthed graves instead of corpses—pre­
sumably as a substitute when it was not possible for the actual human body to be 
buried.13 Statues were clearly more than tributary objects; they somehow could 
“live” or exist on behalf of the absent or unseen.
Archaeologist Nigel Spivey argues that “classical Greece remains the very 
locus classicus for stories of [statue] animation.”14 According to popular belief, 
statues were far more than artistic or commemorative objects. Indeed, “cult statues 
were regarded as properly vicarious. That is, the statues contained powers of 
response: statues embodied will, personality, spirit.”15 Spivey argues that, for 
members of ancient Greek society, the barrier between “animate” and “inanimate” 
was sometimes unclear—something that modern critics should understand in view 
of our own obsession with “virtual reality.”16 Spivey, quite appropriately, points 
to Ovid’s classic rendition of Pygmalion as a story indicative of this blurred line 
between statue and living being.17
Steiner explains the dynamics behind Greek cultic statue ontology using the 
imagery of two worlds: the mortal world and an invisible world of gods and ghosts. 
A cult statue, in particular, could be understood as a “stepping stone pointing to 
the original that gives the viewer access to a hidden or absent reality.”18 For all 
intents and purposes, the statue becomes a portal to another realm, such as the 
world of the gods.
The figures, together with the uncanny powers ascribed to them, supply visualizations 
and expressions o f the gap between mortals and divinities, and a means o f contrasting 
two entirely distinct modes o f being.19
She goes on to explain:
Theophanies . . .  are so hard to tell apart not only because the Greek literary and epi- 
graphic sources regularly use the term theos for the god and his representation both,
12 Derek Collins, Magic in the Ancient Greek World (Blackwell Ancient Religions; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2008) 95.
13 See Donna C. Kurtz and John Boardman, Greek Burial Customs (Aspects of Greek and 
Roman Life; Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971) 247-59.
14 See Nigel Spivey, “Bionic Statues,” in The Greek World(ed. Anton Powell; London: Rout- 
ledge, 1995)442-62.
15 Ibid., 452. See also Jorg Riipke, Religion o f the Romans (Cambridge: Polity, 2007) 74.
16 Spivey, “Bionic Statues,” 455.
17 Ibid., 443. Riipke, similarly, refers to Roman views that place statues into an “indeterminate 
zone, where one could move at will between the two opposing poles, animate and inanimate” (Reli­
gion o f the Romans, 73).
18 Steiner, Images in Mind, 5.
19 Ibid., 183.
JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN IDOL POLEMIC 709
but also because the behavior o f the Olympians seems so frequently to “spill over” 
into that exhibited by their images: the very modes in which the gods o f myth, anec­
dote, and literary account declare their presence and demonstrate their prerogatives 
determine, and are matched by, the activities ascribed to their images.20
So, for Greeks, Steiner explains, a statue is “not so much a representation of the 
absent god, bu t . . .  an object that has assumed his predicates, too.”21
If we recall the assumption of some biblical scholars that the Jewish idol 
polemic is a caricature and that the Greeks and Romans did not actually believe 
their cult statues were real gods, it would seem that the matter is much more com­
plex and ambiguous when the evidence from Greco-Roman sources is closely 
examined. Certainly there was a concern among the Greek philosophers that 
“images” should not be equated with the gods themselves, but because the phi­
losophers’ rhetoric is so strong, it only seems to prove the point that common 
worshipers did in fact make these kinds of assumptions. It would seem, then, that 
when the Jewish writers urged readers not to worship statues, this was a genuine 
prohibition, not merely a mockery. The common perception among most worship­
ers in the Greco-Roman world was that there was something unique about these 
objects— inexplicably, they transferred the god into the mortal realm for access 
and efficacy.
How might we describe this view of cult statues, then? The most plausible 
theory should make some sense of this tension in Greco-Roman thought that views 
the statue as an object that stands at the boundary between the world of the human 
and the visible, and the world of the invisible—a world of gods, ghosts, and the 
dead. Using this two-world framework, we can suggest a key feature attributed to 
statues by Greeks and Romans: amphicosmic ontology, an existence that places 
the statue on the boundary between two dimensions.
Sarah lies Johnston discusses how Greeks used statues to deal with spiritual 
attacks from the dead, such as unwanted “visitants” terrorizing a householder. 
According to a lex sacra from Selinous, the victimized householder was instructed 
to make wooden or clay figures, both male and female, and offer them food.22 The 
householder then would transfer the figurine(s) to a remote area (such as an unin-
20 Ibid., 135.
31 Ibid., 157. Jean-Pierre Vemant expresses this notion aptly: “the idea is to establish real 
contact with the world beyond, to actualize it, to make it present, and thereby to participate inti­
mately in the divine.” Nevertheless, Vemant insists that there is danger in this endeavor and the 
lines, though blurred, cannot be erased: “it [the world beyond] must also emphasize what is inac­
cessible and mysterious in divinity, its alien quality, its otherness” (Vemant, “From the ‘Presentifi- 
cation’ of the Invisible to the Imitation of Appearance,” in idem, Mortals and Immortals: Collected 
Essays [ed. Froma I. Zeitlin; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991] 143-74, here 153). See 
also Julia Kindt, Rethinking Greek Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 50.
22 Sarah lies Johnston, Restless Dead: Encounters between the Living and the Dead in Ancient 
Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) 59. She comments that figures are made
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habited forest). The logic appears to be that the ghost is “transferred into the 
statue.” Mortals could ostensibly control “restless ghosts” using such a technique. 
For example, the Spartans fashioned a statue of traitor Pausanias to control his 
ghost.23
Johnston mentions a different example regarding the command of the oracle 
of Delphi to the Orchomenians regarding the trouble-making ghost of Theban hero 
Actaeon. The oracle instructed the Orchomenians to bury Actaeon’s body and bind 
a statue of him to a rock. Another kind of relevant practice among Greeks that 
Johnston discusses pertains to what she calls “magical dolls,” similar to what we 
think of as voodoo dolls: “by affecting the doll, one affected the individual whom 
the doll represented.”24 Obviously the idea is that the object is more than repre­
sentational; it vicariously aids the artificer and/or the owner in controlling the 
“person.”25
Again, all of these stories point to a conceptualization of statues that goes far 
beyond merely monument and art. It is even too simple to reduce pagan belief to 
the idea that the numinous power of the god rested within the statue, as water rests 
in a jug. When the common worshiper approached the statue, he or she did so 
believing the god to be truly present, and often hoping for a genuine response. In 
the way that Herodotus describes the erection and use of honorary statues of “dead- 
and-missing” heroes, Steiner explains, he attributes to them a “quasi-sacred status, 
suggestive of its capacity to actualize the individual’s power at the site and make 
it continuously accessible to those who have erected the monument.”26
An interesting case study is discussed by Spivey, one that sheds light on the 
amphicosmic ontology attributed to cultic statues by Greeks and Romans. Spivey 
points to the discovery of a vase from Apulia (fourth century b .c .e .). Depicted on 
the vase is a temple of Apollo. Inside the temple one can see the figure of Apollo 
holding bow and patera. Just outside the temple there is another picture of Apollo, 
but this one is seated and plucking a lyre. Spivey asks, “Will the real Apollo please 
announce himself?”27 By that he means: What did the artist have in mind in his 
double-presentation of Apollo? Spivey entertains three options. First, it could be 
that the figure inside of the temple, being slightly more rigid and austere, is meant
both male and female if the householder does not know the visitant. If the visitant is known, however, 
the householder would make only the appropriately gendered figurine.
23 See Thucydides Hist. 1.134.4-135.1; Pausanias Descr. 3.17.7-9; Diodorus Siculus 11.45; 
Themistocles Ep. 5.15; Aristodemus (Die Fragmente dergriechischen Historiker [ed. Felix Jacoby; 
Leiden: Brill, 1954-64] 104 F 8).
24 Johnston, Restless Dead, 60. See also Christopher A. Faraone, “Binding and Burying the 
Forces of Evil: The Defensive Use o f ‘Voodoo Dolls’ in Ancient Greece,” Classical Antiquity 10 
(1991) 165-205.
25 Johnston, Restless Dead, 62.
26 Steiner, Images in Mind, 8-9.
27 Spivey, “Bionic Statues,” 451.
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to reflect the temple statue of Apollo, and the person outside is the god himself. 
This option would align more or less with how the biblical scholars mentioned 
above tend to view the matter. A second option would be that the artist is represent­
ing the unique divinity o f the god by showing that he can be in more than one place 
at one time. Spivey, however, considers a third choice, which has the potential to 
marry the other two views. Could it be that the in-temple figure is the statue, and 
the out-of-temple figure is the heavenly god, but they are both Apollo and both are 
direct and legitimate recipients o f worship? If  this perspective is realistic, a statue 
is not just a statue but is considered bionic: “Greek statues are ‘bionic’ because 
they are amazing, superhuman, and surprising.”28
III. The Nature and Activity of Cult Statues in Light of 
Jewish Idol Polemic
I began this essay by noting that Jewish writers could be quite hostile toward 
the worshipers o f idols. Their line o f reasoning was often based on five ideas: 
(1) the idol is a human creation; (2) the idol is not alive; (3) the idol does not have 
natural senses (seeing, hearing, speaking); (4) the idol cannot move; and (5) the 
idol is inefficacious (i.e., useless). Four o f these accusations appear together in 
Psalm 135:
The idols of the nations are silver and gold, 
the work of human hands.
They have mouths, but they do not speak;
they have eyes, but they do not see; 
they have ears, but they do not hear, 
and there is no breath in their mouths.
Those who make them 
and all who trust them 
shall become like them. (135:15-17)29
The fifth, that the idol is immobile, is articulated clearly in the Epistle o f Jeremiah:
Having no feet, they are carried on the shoulders of others, revealing to humankind 
their worthlessness. And those who serve them are put to shame because, if any of 
these gods falls to the ground, they themselves must pick it up. If anyone sets it upright, 
it cannot move itself; and if it is tipped over, it cannot straighten itself. Gifts are placed 
before them just as before the dead. (26-27)
Many biblical scholars find these criticisms an unfair caricature o f pagan religion. 
I have shown above, though, that it is not so much that Greeks and Romans were
28 Ibid., 445.
29 All English quotations from biblical and LXX apocryphal texts are from the NRSV unless 
otherwise noted.
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simpleminded and naively equated their cult statues with deities such as Zeus or 
Hera. Rather, we may more properly reason that their perception of the statue-deity 
association is complex and ambiguous, which is more fitting in view of a variety 
of experiences, myths, personal accounts, and philosophical speculations that 
make up their worldview and religious imagination. Indeed, it is in appeal to the 
many stories about cult statues from Greek and Roman antiquity that we see how 
realistic and direct Jewish concerns actually were. Their mockery was “legitimate” 
insofar as everyday people in the Hellenistic and Roman world tended to think that 
the statues of their gods were living and active. To underscore this point, then, I 
will take each major Jewish idol-polemic accusation and show that Greeks and 
Romans did, indeed, seem to hold these views.
A. The Origin o f  the Cult Statue
A very common line of reasoning in Jewish literature for the spurning of idol 
worship is the concern over the origins of the cult statue. Isaiah 44:13-20 narrates 
the irrationality of such obeisance in view of the base production of the object of 
worship:30
The carpenter stretches a line, marks it out with a stylus, fashions it with planes, and 
marks it with a compass; he makes it in human form, with human beauty, to be set up 
in a shrine. He cuts down cedars or chooses a holm tree or an oak and lets it grow 
strong among the trees of the forest. He plants a cedar and the rain nourishes it. Then 
it can be used as fuel. Part of it he takes and warms himself; he kindles a fire and bakes 
bread. Then he makes a god and worships it, makes a carved image and bows down 
before it. (Isa 44:13-17)
Jews ridiculed the idea that something divine could come from the same substance 
as wood for a fire. We see this same incredulity stated matter-of-factly in the Letter 
ofAristeas:
For it would be utterly foolish to suppose that any one became a god in virtue of his 
inventions. For the inventors simply took certain objects already created and by com­
bining them together, showed that they possessed a fresh utility: they did not them­
selves create the substance of the thing, and so it is a vain and foolish thing for people 
to make gods of men like themselves. (136)
Philo takes what he assumes to be the foolish logic of pagans one step further by 
urging that it would make more sense to pray and sacrifice to the artisans of the 
statues and the materials of composition and production (anvils, hammers, engrav­
ing tools, measuring devices) than to the final products {Dec. 72).
30 See Michael B. Dick, “Prophetic Parodies of Making the Cult Image,” in Born in Heaven, 
Made on Earth: The Making o f the Cult Image in the Ancient Near East (ed. Michael B. Dick; 
Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1999) 1-53.
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Obviously Plato, Horace, and certainly other pagan thinkers recognized the 
challenge posed by the humble origins of the cult statues of their religious heritage. 
Perhaps many everyday worshipers did not know the origins of their cult statues 
or simply did not care to know. For the more reflective, there was one way to 
approach this conundrum, namely, to regard the skilled artificer as holy. Spivey 
points to what we might call the “Daedalus effect”—attribution to a professional 
sculptor of nearly godlike abilities. He explains,
The artist displayed skill, techne, by his representation o f the divine; he also demon­
strated a mysterious semi-divine status— since to be able to represent the gods he must 
have “seen” them, if  only in his mind’s eye. So Daedalus stands at the head o f a tradi­
tion that imputes numinous insight to the artist, eventually pervading the Renaissance 
hagiographies o f Giotto, Michelangelo et al.— the artist as a vehicle for divine com­
munication, therefore a “divine maker” (deus artifex).31
Thus, Greeks and Romans could find ways to make sense of how a temple statue, 
hewn from earthly materials, could actualize the presence of the divine. Mere 
knowledge of this pagan idea of the deus artifex would surely not have silenced 
Jewish skepticism, but it does allow us to see that Jews were attacking an actual 
basis of belief for their pagan neighbors.
B. The Life o f  the Cult Statue
In Jewish tradition, the God of Israel is the only living and true God who 
breathed life into all creatures.32 In a number of OT texts, reference is made to an 
idol being devoid of “breath” or “spirit” (LXX: 7tvsupa; Jer 10:14; 51:17; Hab 
2:19; Ps 135:17). The Wisdom of Solomon mentions that the statues of false gods 
do not even have nostrils, so they cannot breathe air (Wis 15:15). In the tale of 
Joseph and Aseneth, twice the gods of Aseneth are referred to as “dead and mute 
idols” (8.5; 12.6). Similarly, the Didache refers to idols as “dead gods” (6.3).
Did pagans think that their statues were alive? George L. Hersey addresses
31 Nigel Spivey, Greek Sculpture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 61. Else­
where, Spivey (“Bionic Statues,” 458) explains that the Greeks had a tradition whereby they attrib­
uted to certain artists enthousiasmos (“inspiration,” “enthusiasm”). Ernst Kris and Otto Kurz explain 
that, in the time of the Greek city-states, artists were not recognized or well respected, partly because 
of their work in manual labor, and partly based on the Platonic notion that a representation inevita­
bly pales in comparison to the original (see Legend, Myth, and Magic in the Image o f the Artist: An 
Historical Experiment [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979] 38-60). Kris and Kurz argue that 
it was only beginning in the fourth century b.c.e . that this began to change and an appreciation for 
artists developed (detected, for example, in the works of Xenocrates and Duris).
32 See Richard Bauckham, “The ‘Most High’ God and the Nature of Early Jewish Monothe­
ism,” in Israel's God and Rebecca’s Children: Christology and Community in Early Judaism and 
Christianity. Essays in Honor o f Larry W. Hurtado and Alan F. Segal (ed. David B. Capes et al.; 
Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007) 39-53, esp. 40-41.
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this matter by giving attention to inscriptions found on statue pedestals. Such texts 
are often found in first person singular form, as if the statue were speaking directly 
to the passerby.33 Much evidence will be provided below to show that many pagans 
thought that statues could move, talk, and give aid, but I will offer two important 
anecdotes here as “proof of life,” as it were, in the Greek and Roman minds. G. W. 
Bowersock offers a memorable account from Dio Cassius, who reported that the 
statue of Minerva (near Mutina) apparently could discharge both blood and milk 
(46.33.4).34 Strabo reported that, when the statue of Trojan Athena (at Heracleia) 
witnessed worshipers being dragged away by hostile Ionians, she closed her eyes: 
“even today, the wooden image can be seen to close its eyes,” Strabo added (Geogr. 
6. 1. 14).35
C. The Sensory Functions and Mobility o f Cult Statues
The Jewish legend called Bel and the Dragon narrates a series of interactions 
between Daniel and Cyrus the Persian, who worshiped the Babylonian god Bel. 
The narrator explains that the Babylonians fed the statue of Bel about one hundred 
gallons of flour, forty sheep, and sixty gallons of wine every day. When the king 
inquired as to why Daniel did not worship Bel, Daniel replied, “Because I do not 
revere idols made with hands, but the living God, who created heaven and earth 
and has dominion over all living creatures” (5). The king addresses the suggestion 
that Bel is not living by pointing out his god’s voracious appetite. Daniel knows 
that the statue is nothing more than clay and bronze. The king puts a bet on it that 
will expose the liar as either Daniel or the priests of Bel.
Despite the fact that the priests of Bel use a special hidden door to enter the 
shrine at night and clandestinely consume all the choice food and drink, Daniel 
outsmarts them by secretly dusting the ground to reveal their footprints. With the 
ruse exposed and the king outraged at the deceit, Daniel is given permission to 
destroy the statue of Bel as well as its temple.
If this Daniel mocks the statue that cannot eat, so also the Epistle of Jeremiah 
ridicules the immobile idols: “Having no feet, they are carried on the shoulders of 
others, revealing to humankind their worthlessness (26a; see above). Also, the 
Wisdom of Solomon underscores the full scale of the idol’s worthlessness: “these 
have neither the use of their eyes to see with, nor their nostrils with which to draw 
breath, nor ears with which to hear, nor fingers to feel with, and their feet are of 
no use for walking” (15.15).
George L. Hersey, Failing in Love with Statues: Artificial Humans from Pygmalion to the 
Present (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009) 14.
34 See G. W. Bowersock, “The Mechanics of Subversion in the Roman Provinces,” in Oppo­
sition et resistances a l ’empire d ’Auguste a Trajan (ed. Kurt Raaflaub et al.; Geneva- Fondation 
Hardt, 1987) 291-320.
35 See Hersey, Falling in Love with Statues, 14.
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While this comprehensive denunciation of idols might seem shocking to their 
pagan neighbors, it should be kept in mind that it was not the common experience 
for everyday Greek and Roman worshipers to converse with their cult statues and 
see them move. In fact, as Steiner puts it, “A host of semi-proverbial [Greek] 
expressions declares the nullity of the image: it frequently carries the epithets 
akinetos (‘unmoving’), apathes (‘unfeeling’), aphonos (‘voiceless’); to be silent 
is to be like tois chalkois andriasi (‘bronze images’); to lack feeling is to be a 
bretas anaisthetos (‘unperceiving statue’).”36
This is one area, then, where we might say that pagans did, in fact, know 
better than to believe statues are simply speaking, seeing, and moving all of the 
time. Greeks and Romans had a wider mythic understanding of petrification, where 
mortals and other living creatures are transformed into stone, demonstrating the 
tension between “fleet-footedness and fixity peculiar to the fashioned stone.”37 Yet 
the matter is not so simple. One can find case after case where statues behave like 
living beings. Dionysius of Halicarnassus offers a report of a statue of Fortune who 
spoke to her supplicants “in Latin in a voice both distinct and loud,” saying, “You 
have conformed to the holy law of the city, matrons, in dedicating me” (Ant. mm. 
8.56.2-3).38 And, if statues can speak, it is presumed that they can hear, though we 
also have a story regarding a custom in Rome whereby the names of people enter­
ing the Capitoline temple were announced to Jupiter’s statue, with mention also 
made of the time of day.39
In terms of movement, Dio Cassuis reports that when Gaius Vibius Pansa 
departed from Pharsalus (Thessaly, 48 b.c.e .), the statue of the Mother of the Gods 
on the Palatine Hill turned its face from east to west and spat blood (46.43). In 38 
b.c.e., during a Roman tax revolt, the statue of Virtus fell on its face as a sign of 
disappointment. Afterwards, it had to be purified in the sea on account of the sins 
of the people (ibid.). Perhaps no tale of a mobile statue is more peculiar and inter­
esting than that of Apollo in Lucian’s record. Lucian claims to be an eyewitness in 
a temple of Apollo. When the god desired to pronounce an oracle, the statue would 
walk over to a throne. If the priests did not immediately hoist the pedestal onto their 
shoulders, the statue would then sweat and begin to pace (De Syria Dea 36-37).
How is it possible that Greeks and Romans had this kind of contradictory 
perspective of cult statues—understanding them, on the one hand, as motionless 
and frozen and, on the other hand, as active and animate? Steiner offers a helpful 
theory. She argues that the statue does actualize the presence of a deity in the Greek
36 Steiner, Images in Mind, 136. See, for follow-up references, Aeschines fr. 37 Dittmar; cf. 
Xenophon Lac. 3.5; Anaxandrides fr. 11KA; Paroem. Gr. 1.347.
37 Steiner, Images in Mind, 138.
38 See Bussels, Animated Image, 141.
39 Riipke, Religion o f the Romans, 102-3. In addition, the historian Herodotus twice recounts 
how particular supplicants stood before an image of a goddess and prayed for someone else (1.31.6; 
6.61.3).
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world, but the stillness and silence of the statue are a reminder that a necessary gap 
still separates the world of the gods from the world of mortals. That the statue is 
typically unresponsive is a reminder that the god reveals himself or herself at will 
and not at the beck and call of suppliants.40 It is as if the statue becomes a meeting 
place for devotee and deity, and the deity will choose to show up, sometimes with 
words and actions.
D. The Efficacy o f  Idols
The Apocalypse o f  Abraham portrays the young Abraham serving the gods 
of his father, Terah. The opening scene of the apocalypse borders on satirical:
Having entered their temple for the service, I found a god named Marumath, carved 
from stone, fallen at the feet of the iron god Nakhin. And it came to pass, that when I 
saw it my heart was perplexed and I thought in my mind that I, Abraham, could not 
put it back in its place alone, because it was heavy, (being made) of a big stone. But I 
went and told my father, and he came in with me. And when we both lifted it to put it 
in its place, its head fell off, even while I was holding it by its head. (1.3-4)
Later on, Abraham is sent to sell some cult statues. On his way, his donkey is 
frightened and, while running off, tosses the “gods” in tow. Three statues are 
crushed (2.4). Abraham, despondent and confused by the fragility of his objects of 
worship, reflects on the folly of his occupation and religion.
“What is this inequality of activity which my father is doing? Is it not he rather who 
is god for his gods, because they come into being from his sculpting, his planing, and 
his skill? They [the purchasers of the statues] ought to honor my father because they 
are his work. What is this food of my father in his works? Behold, Marumath fell and 
could not stand up in his sanctuary, nor could 1 myself lift him until my father came 
and we raised him up. And even so we were not able (to do it) and his head fell off of 
him. And he put it on another stone of another god, which he had made without a head. 
And . . .  the other five gods which got smashed (in falling) from the ass, who could 
not save themselves and injure the ass because it smashed them, nor did their shards 
come up out of the river.” And I said to my heart, “If it is so, how then can my father’s 
god Marumath, which has the head of another stone and which is made from another 
stone, save a man, or hear a man’s prayer, or give him any gift?” (3.2-8)
This self-dialogue of the pensive Abraham reflects the common accusation made 
by Jews against pagans, that their statues are impotent—they cannot save them­
selves, so they cannot be expected to save anyone else (see 3:7 in particular).
The Epistle of Jeremiah is more overt in its mockery: they cannot “save” 
(SictcrtpCa)) themselves from rust and corrosion and cannot even wipe dust off their 
faces (12-13). It goes on, “One of them holds a scepter, like a district judge, but is
40 See Steiner, Images in Mind, 135-84.
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unable to destroy anyone who offends it. Another has a dagger in its right hand, 
and an ax, but cannot defend itself from war and robbers” (14-15). Again, they 
cannot “save” (out (to) themselves from war or disaster (49). They neither choose 
leaders nor send rain (53). They cannot acquit the falsely charged (54). Without 
help, a temple fire will consume them (55). Perhaps the most derisive, but also the 
most incisive, comment made in the Epistle of Jeremiah regards a comparison of 
utility: “So it is better to be a king who shows courage, or a household utensil that 
serves its owner’s need, than to be these false gods; better even the door of a house 
that protects its contents, than these false gods; better also a wooden pillar in a 
palace, than these false gods” (59).
This stinging denunciation is quite relevant for Greek and Roman religion, as 
a common philosophy of worship involves what Luke Timothy Johnson calls “par­
ticipation in divine benefits.” He explains this type of religiosity in this way:
The divine dynamis is conceived as available to humans in the empirical world: reveal­
ing through prophecy, healing through revelation, providing security and status
through Mysteries, enabling and providing for the daily successes o f individuals,
households, cities, and empires.41
The expectation that a cult statue carries a central role of ensuring “security and 
success”42 is underscored by an oft-repeated story about a statue of Apollo. Appar­
ently this deity threatened to abandon the city of Tyre on the eve of Alexander’s 
attack. In reaction, the people attempted to prevent his flight by tying down his 
statue using cords of gold.43 Statues of Athena or Zeus were often located on the 
acropolis in various cities as a protector who would watch from the hilltop.44
Jas Eisner refers to the “apotropaic” affects of cult statues, which could “bind 
wandering spirits and prevent them from troubling the land.”45 Eisner shares a tale 
regarding the image of Apollo (near Magnesia). According to Pausanias, the statue 
could give “strength equal to any task. The men sacred to the god leap down from 
sheer precipices and high rocks, and uprooting trees of exceeding height walk with 
their burdens down the narrowest of paths” (Descr. 10.32.6). Eisner includes
41 Luke Timothy Johnson, Among the Gentiles: Greco-Roman Religion and Christianity 
(AYBRL; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) 46.
42 Ibid., 50. See, similarly, Steiner, Images in Mind, 105: “they aim to make divinity emerge 
and act on behalf of those performing the rite.”
43 See Diodorus Siculus 17.41.7-8; Plutarch Alex. 24.5-8; Quintus Curtius Rufus 4.3.21-22. 
More examples of this sort of behavior are legion; see Pseudo-Lucian Lucius 41; Cicero Scaur. 
23.46; Livy 38.43.4-5.
44 Susan Guettel Cole, “Civic Cult and Civic Identity,” in Sources fo r the Ancient Greek City- 
State: Symposium, August 24-27,1994. Acts o f the Copenhagen Polis Centre 2 (ed. Mogens Herman 
Hansen; Historisk-filosofiske Meddeelelser 72; Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1995) 292-325.
45 Jas Eisner, Roman Eyes: Visuality and Subjectivity in Art and Text (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007) 31: “Numinous images may have miraculous effects on their beholders— 
not only healing . . . but also instilling remarkable qualities.”
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visions and prophetic and curative dreams as gifts of the gods as well which could 
be mediated through statues.46
That is not to say that deities served at the bidding of the citizens. They could 
instill much fear as well. For example, Plutarch recounts the rituals associated with 
Artemis Soteria at Pellene. The local residents attest that the image “usually stands 
untouched, and when a priestess happens at any time to remove it and carry it out 
from the temple, nobody looks at it, but all turn their faces from it; for not only is 
the sight terrible and harmful to mankind, but it even makes the trees past which 
it has been carried become barren and cast their fruit” (Plutarch Arat. 32.2; cf. 
Pausanias Descr. 7.27.3). Hersey shares an interesting tale regarding a cult statue 
of Samos. This image of Hera was stolen from its temple by pirates. Once on board 
their ship, the statue prevented the boat from moving until it was removed. The 
residents of Samos who found it on the beach supposed that it had run away and 
proceeded to tie it to a willow tree.47
This anecdotal evidence should be proof enough that Jews could make a 
relevant (albeit often sardonic) accusation against pagan idols that they cannot 
protect or bless because they are not real gods. This is, again, the most significant 
concern for Jews because, first, they believed that their God alone could save, and, 
second, pagans visited, fed, worshiped, prayed to, and even gave offerings of 
money in hopes of security and reward. The mantra of the Epistle of Jeremiah (e.g., 
6:23,29) is, therefore, memorable in this regard: these are not gods, do not worship 
them. They cannot hear, see, speak, or move because they are lifeless. If they are 
dead, they cannot save.
IV. Conclusion
What can we say, then, about Jewish and Christian idol polemic and Greco- 
Roman cult statue ontology? When the prophet or apostle says, “Do not worship 
these statues, they are not true deities,” how would a Greek or Roman have under­
stood this? It would seem that many biblical scholars have assumed that the pagan 
neighbors of the Jews would have simply agreed, explaining that the statue was 
merely a symbol or reminder of the invisible presence of the god. Now, perhaps 
we can say that the purpose, it would seem, of attributing to Greeks and Romans 
this differentiating viewpoint is borne out of an attempt to make these ancient 
worshipers seem less primitive and more sophisticated. There is nothing wrong 
with attempting to take an emic perspective and to think about the inner rationality
46 Ibid., 42.
47 See Hersey, Falling in Love with Statues, 17. Cf. Menodotus Samius (Die Fragmente 
griechischen Historiker, 541 F 1); a variant tradition is cited by Pausanias Descr. 7.4.4; see also Karl 
Meuli, “Die gefesselten Gotter,” in Gesammelte Schriften (ed. Thomas Gelzer; 2 vols.; Basel: 
Schwabe, 1975)2:1060-61.
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of a religious viewpoint. Yet, when we look at archaeological and Greco-Roman 
literary materials closely, as 1 have tried to do here, the matter is not as simple as 
some would make it seem.
We can say with good confidence that Greeks and Romans did not think that 
a deity exclusively and eternally existed as a statue in a temple. The preponderance 
of evidence, however, from a wide variety of authors, regions, and time periods, 
shows that the cult statue was treated with a unique ontology, as if a bridge between 
two worlds. It was considered, at least sometimes, to be alive and could be addressed 
as the god himself. Statues were regularly groomed and fed. They were often 
treated as living beings, whether being escorted to the toilet or taken away on a 
retreat. If early Jews and Christians can be faulted for unkind mockery and cruel 
exaggeration and hyperbole, that does not amount to a wholesale dismissal of their 
central concern: objects should never be worshiped because they are created works 
and not the Creator. While Greeks and Romans would have undoubtedly disagreed 
with this concern, by and large, I do not believe they would have found it a gross 
error for Jews to think that homage was paid by pagans to their god directly through 
a living and efficacious cult statue, an effigy they considered to have amphicosmic 
ontology.
